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The Colombian economy and financial system have coped reasonably well with the 
effects of the global financial crisis. Hence, “unconventional” policy measures have not 
been at the center of the policy decisions and discussions. Nominal short term interest 
rates have remained the main monetary policy tool and “Quantitative easing” measures 
have not been central in the policy response. The one “unconventional” monetary 
instrument used by the Central Bank in Colombia has been changes in reserve 
requirements (RR) on financial system deposits. Interestingly, they were adopted before 
the global financial crisis, as a reaction to domestic credit conditions. The effects of RR 
on interest rate and interest rate pass-through in an inflation targeting regime are not as 
straightforward as those under a monetary targeting regime. Conceptually, those effects 
depend on the degree of substitution between deposits and central bank credit as sources 
of funds for banks and on the extent to which RR changes affect the risks facing banks. 
The empirical results for Colombia suggest that RR are important long run determinants 
of business loan interest rates and have been effective in strengthening the pass-through 
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Effects of Reserve Requirements in an Inflation Targeting Regime: 
The Case of Colombia 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The Colombian economy and financial system have coped reasonably well with the 
effects of the global financial crisis. Hence, “unconventional” policy measures have not 
been at the center of the policy decisions and discussions. 
 
Even though bank loans decelerated markedly in 2009, they are still growing in real 
terms and credit markets have not experienced the severe crunch that is hindering 
economic growth in other parts of the world. Deposit, loan, bond and interbank markets 
have not undergone any important disruption. This has been a consequence of the 
restrictions and prudential regulation that existed before 2006 or were introduced 
thereafter (Uribe, 2008a, 2008b and 2009). As a result, there has been little room for 
“unconventional” financial/monetary policy measures aimed at preserving liquidity in 
key markets, or at reactivating the credit channel for firms and households. For 
example, the collateral requirements and maturity of Central Bank credit facilities have 
remained basically unchanged since the onset of the crisis.  
 
At the same time, annual CPI inflation has decreased significantly from 7.67% in 
December 2008 to 2% a year later. Unlike other countries, however, this reversion has 
not turned into deflation and the economic slowdown has been relatively moderate. 
Thus, nominal short term interest rates have not hit the zero bound and have remained 
the main monetary policy tool. “Quantitative easing” measures have not been central in 
the policy response. 
 
Changes in reserve requirements (RR hereafter) on financial system deposits have been 
the one “unconventional” monetary instrument used by the Central Bank in Colombia. 
Interestingly, they were adopted before the global financial crisis, as a reaction to 
domestic credit conditions. Between the second semester of 2006 and the first half of 
2007 the Colombian financial system produced a rapid expansion of loan supply, 
partially offsetting the monetary policy tightening pursued by the Central Bank to curb 
excessive expenditure growth and inflation. Marginal reserve requirements were then 
introduced in May 2007 to try to reinforce the transmission of policy interest rate 
increases and to limit credit growth. Towards the third quarter 2008 the economy started 
to show sings of a slowdown and, as uncertainty about the effects of the crisis increased 
the liquidity risk perception of financial intermediaries, some local lending interest rates 
rose in the fourth quarter of 2008. The Central Bank responded by reducing RR to 
enlarge the liquidity in the hands of banks.  
 
What is the role of RR as a monetary policy tool in an inflation targeting regime, where 
the central bank stabilizes the short term interest rate? What were the effects of the 
changes in RR on the transmission of policy rate movements? Were the changes in RR 
effective in achieving the objectives that motivated them?  This paper is an attempt to 
answer these questions. The next section provides the rationale for the use of RR as a 
monetary policy instrument in an inflation targeting regime, both theoretically and in 
the context of the Colombian economy over the past three years. Then the effects of RR 




2.  The Rationale for RR as Monetary Policy Tools in an Inflation Targeting 
Regime 
 
a. Events in Colombian Credit Markets 
 
Following a prolonged decline in sovereign risk premia and inflation, local Government 
bond long interest rates fell significantly between 2003 and 2005 (Graph 1). Colombian 
financial intermediaries had steadily increased their share of local public bonds in total 
assets since 2003 (Graph 2) and benefited substantially from the rising trend in public 
bond prices. By the first quarter of 2006, bond holdings represented about a third of 
banks´ assets, implying a large exposure to unhedged market risk (Vargas et al., 2006). 
These institutions sustained large losses in the second quarter of 2006, when a spike in 
global risk aversion caused a drop in the price of domestic public bonds.  
 
In response, financial intermediaries reduced their exposure to market risk and abruptly 
shifted their asset portfolio away from Government bonds and into loans to firms and 
households (Graph 2). In doing so, they delayed or offset the tightening of monetary 
policy that the Central Bank had started in April 2006 to slow aggregate expenditure 
and prevent emerging inflationary pressures (Graph 3). While policy interest rates 
increased throughout 2006 and the first quarter of 2007, consumer, commercial and 
mortgage lending rates dropped or remained stable (Graphs 4 and 5). Only short term 
commercial bank treasury rates and prime lending rates increased along with the policy 
interest rate (Graph 6).  
 
At the same time, average financial system credit real growth rates jumped from 15.2%  
in the first semester 2006 to 25.3%  in the second semester of 2006 and 26.3% in the 
first half of 2007 (Graph 7). The behavior of prices and quantities in the loan markets 
suggested the effect of a supply shock generated by the shift in the bank asset portfolio. 
The near one-year delay in the transmission of policy rate hikes (Graphs 4 and 5) and 
the abrupt jump of loan growth raised concerns in the Central Bank about both price and 
financial stability. There was also apprehension about the quality of the new loans, 
especially in the consumer credit segment (Graph 8)
1.  
 
Hence, it was deemed crucial to intervene in the credit markets to prevent excessive 
leverage of the private sector and control the credit risk of the financial system. Loan 
provisioning requirements were increased by the Financial Superintendency
2, while the 
Central Bank introduced marginal reserve requirements on domestic deposits in May 
2007 (Table 1). Reserve requirements on foreign indebtedness were reactivated as a 
complementary measure. 
  
                                                 
1 Consumer credit growth rates went from 29.4% on average in the second semester of 2005 to 37.5% in the first half 
of 2006, 42.2% in the second semester of 2006 and 39.5% in the first semester of 2007. 
2 A system to manage commercial loan credit risk (SARC) was introduced by the Financial Superintendency in July 
2007. This system determines the loan provisioning requirements for commercial loans depending on each loan´s risk 
qualification. Since higher provisions were foreseen before implementation, the Superintendency required a gradual 
upward adjustment in provisions prior to the formal introduction of SARC. Something similar occurred with the 
adoption of an analogous system for consumer credit. The system was formally introduced in July 2008, but 
provisioning requirements were raised since June 2007.  5 
 
In June 2007 RR and their remuneration were again modified to lump savings accounts 
and sight deposits in one group
3. The rationale was that the distinction between these 
types of deposits in terms of liquidity had been blurred, so their RR should be leveled as 
well. A year later the Central Bank changed again the RR to sterilize part of the 
monetary expansion caused by a program of international reserve purchases. This time 
the marginal reserve requirements were eliminated, but the average levels were 
increased (Table 1).  
 
In the last quarter of 2008, following the Lehman Bros. Bankruptcy, commercial bank 
treasury interest rates and prime lending rates rose (Graph 9). Interestingly, in the same 
period longer maturity loan rates (consumer and commercial) did not increase (Graph 
10), suggesting that financial intermediaries were concerned mostly about liquidity and 
not credit risk at the time. A bank liquidity gap indicator shows a slight deterioration in 
the same period (Graph 11)
4. The Central Bank then acted preemptively, allowing the 
currency to depreciate with minimal intervention in the FX market and reducing RR to 
ensure the availability of local currency liquidity (Table 1). Finally, remuneration of RR 
was reduced in January 2009 and eliminated altogether in July 2009. 
 
In sum, RR have been used in Colombia since May 2007 to enhance the transmission of 
policy interest rates and curb credit growth, to sterilize FX purchases by the Central 
Bank and to guarantee the provision of liquidity in periods of potential turmoil. Among 
these objectives, the first one deserves especial attention, for RR had been used in the 
past in Colombia as a monetary policy tool under financially-repressed, monetary 
targeting regimes. Their use in an inflation targeting (IT) regime where the Central 
Bank stabilizes the interest rate in the short term had no precedent in the country.  
 
b. Reserve Requirements in an Inflation Targeting Regime 
 
In a monetary targeting regime, an increase in RR causes a rise in base money demand 
and, given the money supply, pushes up short term interest rates. In a regime that 
stabilizes short term interest rates, such as the conventional IT strategy, the central bank 
will provide the additional money demand implied by larger RR, so that short term 
interest rates do not change. Thus, the effects of RR in such a regime are not as 
straightforward as those under a monetary targeting regime.  
 
In an IT regime RR may affect directly market interest rates and the pass-through from 
the policy interest rate to those interest rates. In both cases, the results would depend on 
the degree of substitution between central bank credit and deposits, as is explained in 
what follows. 
 
(i) Direct Effects of RR on Market Interest Rates 
 
One effect stems from the fact that RR constitute a tax on financial intermediation. 
Therefore, higher RR are reflected in larger interest rate spreads. However, as long as 
central bank credit is a close substitute of deposits as a source of funds for the banks, 
higher RR will produce a fall in deposit interest rates, leaving lending rates unchanged. 
                                                 
3 The existing regime remunerated RR on savings accounts and CDs. 
4 Liquidity Gap Indicator = (Liquid Liabilities-Liquid Assets) / Illiquid assets. Liquid assets include domestic 
Government bonds whose prices fell during the Lehman crisis. This may help explain the observed increase in the 
indicator. 6 
 
Intuitively, a step up in RR makes deposits more expensive, reduces bank demand for 
deposits and increases bank demand for central bank credit. If the interest rate on the 
latter (the policy rate) is constant, the marginal cost of funds for the banks does not 
change and neither does the lending interest rate. In contrast, the fall in bank demand for 
deposits reduces their interest rate. 
 
A key assumption in the foregoing analysis is the high degree of substitution between 
deposits and central bank credit as sources of funds for the banks. If that is not the case, 
a rise in RR will not be fully accommodated with a larger use of central bank credit. 
Thus, both bank supply of loans and demand for deposits will be affected, and so will 
be lending and deposit rates.  
 
Betancourt and Vargas (2009) show that in the presence of interest rate risk and risk 
averse banks, central bank credit and deposits are not perfect substitutes. In this case, an 
increase in RR in an interest rate-smoothing monetary regime raises lending rates and 
has an ambiguous effect on deposit rates. Intuitively, higher RR make deposits more 
expensive and tend to reduce bank demand for deposits and increase bank demand for 
central bank credit. Nevertheless, a larger reliance on term central bank credit adds to 
interest rate risk when the latter has shorter maturities than loans. The increased risk 
reduces the perceived benefits of loans for risk averse banks, restricts loan supply and 
drives lending interest rates up.   
 
The net effect on bank demand for deposits is uncertain. On the one hand, higher RR 
make them more expensive for banks and reduce demand. On the other, if deposits have 
longer maturities than central bank credit, a larger reliance on the latter generates higher 
interest rate risk, makes deposits more convenient and increases deposit demand by 
banks
5. As a result, the effect on deposit interest rates is also ambiguous. 
 
The impact of RR on the volume of loans and deposits follows the effects they have on 
the respective interest rates. If credit demand is inversely related to the lending rate, 
higher RR imply higher loan interest rates and a smaller volume of credit. Given a 
deposit supply schedule, higher RR have an ambiguous effect on the volume of 
deposits. 
 
(ii) Effects of RR on Interest Rate Pass-Through 
 
RR may not only affect market interest rates directly, but also influence the pass-
through from policy rates to market rates. I.e. the transmission of monetary policy is 
determined to some extent by the RR. A policy interest rate hike makes central bank 
credit more expensive and induces banks to rely more on deposits, pushing up deposit 
interest rates. The marginal cost of funds for banks increases, bank loan supply is cut 
and lending interest rates go up. In this context, higher RR do not affect transmission to 
loan rates, but they do influence deposit rates. Increased RR imply costlier additional 
deposits and, therefore, a smaller expansion of deposit demand by banks. Thus, the 
transmission of the policy interest rate hike to deposit rates decreases with the level of 
RR. 
 
                                                 
5 In a world with several types of deposits, it also leads to more reliance on long term deposits. 7 
 
The effect of RR on monetary policy transmission is further complicated when RR 
affect the risks facing banks. For example, in the case studied by Betancourt and Vargas 
(2009), RR induce demand for central bank credit by banks to fund their assets, 
exposing them to interest rate risk. In this situation, a policy rate hike amplifies interest 
rate risk by raising the need for short term central bank credit in the future, as the initial 
borrowing plus the accrued interest must be rolled over. The rise in interest rate risk is 
larger when central bank credit is larger too, which is likely when RR are higher.  
 
Moreover, higher RR reduce the amount in which additional deposits alleviate interest 
rate risk. In this case, one additional dollar in deposits yields less funds to be used to 
substitute for central bank credit. These effects entail a larger cut in loan supply by 
banks in the face of a policy interest rate increase. Therefore, RR strengthens the pass-
through from policy rates to lending interest rates. 
 
The impact of RR on the pass-through to deposit interest rates is ambiguous in this case. 
On the one hand, additional deposits are less profitable in the presence of higher RR, so 
deposit demand by banks expands less after a policy interest rate rise, as mentioned 
above. On the other hand, higher RR exacerbate the interest rate risk related to central 
bank credit and induce banks to demand more deposits instead.  
 
Finally, notice that these outcomes depend on the extent to which the central bank is a 
net creditor of the financial system. When the supply of monetary base is large relative 
to bank reserves, central bank credit to financial institutions may be low or negative, 
even if RR are high (in percentage). In the case of Colombia in recent years, for 
example, international reserve accumulation has provided financial intermediaries with 
large amounts of new deposits, reducing the net creditor position of the central bank. 
According to the foregoing hypotheses, this would weaken interest rate pass-through, 
since the interest rate risk facing banks is lower. Appendix 1 formally shows these 
results in the context of the model by Betancourt and Vargas (2009). 
 
3.  Effects of Reserve Requirements in Colombia 
 
a. Reserve Requirement Measures 
 
To gauge the effects of RR in Colombia, aggregate measures of them must be generated 
(in addition to the deposit-specific ratios). These measures must be related to the 
purpose for which RR were set. The same concept of aggregate RR may not necessarily 
be useful to pin down the effects on both the liquidity of the financial system and the 
impact on credit expansion or market interest rates. In Colombia this is further 
complicated because of the many changes in the structure of RR between 2006 and 
2009, including the establishment of marginal RR and shifts in RR remuneration (Table 
1). 
 
A simple measure of RR is the ratio of Observed Required Reserves to Deposits Subject 
to RR (ORR henceforth). This indicator includes both average and marginal RR (when 
effective) and is affected by the changes in deposit composition occurred throughout the 
period. While ORR is useful to capture the liquidity changes introduced by RR policy, it 
may not be the best measure of the effect of RR changes on the marginal cost of bank 
funds and market interest rates. It may put too much weight on average rather than 
marginal RR and it does not consider movements in RR remuneration 8 
 
 
The last drawback is especially relevant in 2007 and 2009, when RR remuneration was 
changed (Table 1). In addition, the existence of RR remuneration affects the actual 
burden of RR on the marginal cost of bank funds, so the ORR ratio alone may 
overestimate the impact of RR policy on market interest rates. To correct for this 
possible bias, two Remuneration-Adjusted RR (RARR hereafter) concepts were 
calculated as explained in Appendix 2. One allows for changes in deposit composition 
through time, while the other assumes a fixed composition equal to the May 2002-
November 2009 average. This distinction may be important, for RR shifts induced 
important re- compositions of deposits in some periods (Saade and Pérez, 2009).  
 
Graph 12 shows that the dynamics of the three measures are similar up until 2009, when 
RR remuneration was reduced and ultimately eliminated (Table 1). In this year the 
RARR gauges increased, indicating that the burden of RR on market financial 
intermediation rose, despite the fact that RR ratios remained stable. Throughout the 
period 2002-2008 RR remuneration implied a reduction of roughly 1 percentage point 
in RR ratios in terms of their effect on the marginal cost of deposits (Graph 12).   
 
b. Reserve Requirements, Interest Rates and Liquidity 
 
Based on simple inspection of the data it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of RR 
policy in influencing market interest rates. Graph 13 indicates that short term CD 
interest rates (90-360 days) tracked policy interest rates more closely after 2006. 
Savings accounts interest rates are in general more sluggish than policy rates. Longer 
term CD interest rates (greater than 360 days) are more volatile than other deposit 
interest rates, a feature that may be attributed to the relatively small issuance of this type 
of deposits.  
 
The spread between short term CD interest rates and the policy rate started to increase 
around the time marginal RR were adopted and has been growing slowly ever since 
(Graphs 14-15). The spreads for the other deposit interest rates do not exhibit a clear 
relationship with RR. In the particular case of savings accounts interest rates, their 
spread with respect to the policy rate fell after marginal RR were introduced, but rose in 
2009 when RARR measures increased (Graph 16). 
 
Regarding loan interest rates, the impact of RR is not apparent either.  The spreads 
between lending and policy interest rates tended to increase or stopped falling by the 
end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007, before marginal RR were imposed (Graph 17). 
The consumer loan interest rate spread shifted abruptly in February 2007 due to a 
redefinition of the usury limits, which seem to be binding for a significant fraction of 
these loans.  
 
Interestingly, the spreads between commercial bank treasury and prime lending rates 
with respect to the policy rate started to fall in the beginning of 2009, after RR had been 
reduced to increase liquidity. The Central Bank was successful in this regard, since the 
cumulative effect of international reserves purchases and the reduction of RR did 
expand liquidity in money markets, as reflected by the growing deviation of the 
interbank overnight interest rate from the policy rate (Graph 18). 
 9 
 
In general, capturing the effects of RR on market interest rates and interest rate pass-
through requires controlling for other variables affecting deposit and credit markets, like 
economic growth, expectations of future policy rates, credit and sovereign risk shifts 
etc. An empirical exercise along these lines is presented in the next section. 
 
 c. Econometric Evidence 
 
(i) Market Interest Rate Models and the Effects of Reserve Requirements 
 
To assess the effect of RR on market interest rates and interest rate pass-through, a 
simple model is posited in the spirit of the expectations theory of interest rates: 
 
t t t b o m X f s i i
t t ε β β + + + = ) ( 1  (1) 
 
imt is a deposit or loan interest rate, ibt is the overnight policy interest rate, st is the slope 
of the zero-coupon curve for Government bonds corresponding to the average maturity 
of the deposit or loan, and f(Xt) is a function of variables affecting the specific loan or  
deposit market, like industrial production, credit risk, RR etc. The slope of the zero 
coupon curve is intended to proxy the expectations on future central bank interest rates 
and is defined as: 
 
t t b rf t i i s − ≡  
 
irft is the risk-free interest rate for the maturity of the corresponding market interest rate 
(approximated by the Government zero coupon interest rate). 
 
Equation (1) represents a long run relationship between market interest rates and their 
determinants. This is complemented with an error-correction equation describing the 
short run dynamics: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t m b t t m u X L s L i L i e L i
t t t + Δ Ω + Δ Λ + Δ Γ + Δ + Φ + = Δ − − − − − 1 1 1 1 1 γ ε α  
 
εt represents the error correction term. The influence of RR on interest rate pass-through 
is captured by the term γ e t , which shows the additional short-run effect of policy 
interest rates on market rates due to RR.   
 
The estimations were made for different loan and deposit interest rates using Colombian 
monthly data for the period May 2002 – October 2009. The Johansen VEC 
Cointegration methodology was utilized. According to the information criteria (Schwarz 
and Akaike) only one lag turned out to be significant in the VEC models for all cases. 
After verifying normality
6, the existence of at least one cointegrating vector with the 
expected signs and weak endogeneity of market interest rates, we found the following 





                                                 
6 In some cases it was necessary to include dummy variables for particular dates in order to get normality. 10 
 
Long Run Relationships: 
 
•  A positive relationship between the policy interest rate and market rates, except 
for the mortgage rate.  With the exception of the savings accounts and consumer 
loan rates, in all cases the long run coefficient of the policy rate is close to unity. 
For savings account rates the coefficient is significantly less than 1 and for 
consumer loan rates it is greater than 1. 
•  Mortgage loan rates are positively related to long term government bond rates, 
with a coefficient close to 1. 
•  The slope of the zero coupon curve enters positively in the long run relationship 
for consumer, prime and average lending rates. It also appears in the equations 
for CD interest rates.   
•  The RARRh ratio is directly related to commercial, prime and commercial bank 
treasury interest rates, in line with the hypotheses presented above. 
•  Marginal CD RARR ratios have a significant positive impact in the longer term 
and average CD interest rates. Interestingly, longer term CDs, which have a zero 
RR, are positively affected by other CD marginal RR. This is possibly caused by 
a shift in the composition of deposits induced by changes in the RR structure.  
•  (Seasonally adjusted) Industrial Production was found to be directly related to 
commercial, prime and commercial bank treasury interest rates. 
 
Short Run Dynamics: 
 
•  The combined effect of the RARRh ratio and the change in the policy rates is 
significantly positive in the short run dynamics for all market interest rates, 
except mortgage rates
7. I.e. the interest rate pass-through appears to be generally 
strengthened by the RR
8.  
 
The previous result stems from the significance of the coefficient of (RARRh*Δib) in the 
error correction equations for the market interest rates. This is suggestive, but ignores 
the overall dynamics of the VEC system involving the joint interaction of the 
cointegrated variables and their short run responses. This effect is gauged through the 
examination of the impulse-response functions (Charts 1 and 2). After a policy rate 
shock, the responses of market interest rates are larger when the RARRh ratio is higher. 
However, without confidence intervals, the statistical significance of the difference 
between the responses under distinct RR levels cannot be determined
9. 
 
 (ii) Other Features of Interest Rates Dynamics 
 
The long run models posited above may be used to characterize other features of interest 
rate dynamics. Specifically, it is interesting to verify whether interest rate pass-through 
is asymmetric and whether the net creditor position of the Central Bank with the 
financial system affects the short run response of market interest rates to policy rate 
shocks. 
 
                                                 
7 However, mortgage rates are positively affected by changes in policy interest rates in the short run dynamics. 
8 These results did not change when the RARRc measure was used. 
9 A rigorous analysis of the impulse response functions should include confidence intervals. However, this requires 
further work because the short run dynamics equations include a multiplicative interaction that is not considered in 
the standard econometric packages. 11 
 
To check for asymmetric responses of market interest rates to policy rate changes, the 
short run dynamics model used above was modified as follows: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t m b t t m u X L s L i L i dir L i
t t t + Δ Ω + Δ Λ + Δ Γ + Δ + Φ + = Δ − − − − − 1 1 1 1 1 η ε α  
 
dirt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the lagged change in policy rates 
is positive and zero otherwise
10. In general, downward movements in the policy rate 
appear to generate a stronger response of market rates than upward movements (Tables 
4 and 5). In fact, for some market rates (consumer, commercial, average lending rates 




Again, these results are derived from the sign and the significance of coefficient of 
(dir*Δib), which are suggestive, but ignore the joint interaction of the VEC system. 
Charts 3 and 4 confirm that the asymmetric response result holds when the complete 
system dynamics are considered
12. 
 
Turning to the effect of the net creditor position (NCP henceforth) of the central bank 
on interest rate transmission, the short run dynamics equations were transformed as 
follows: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () () t t t m b t t t m
t t t m b t t m
u X L s L i L i ncp dir L i
or
u X L s L i L i ncp L i
t t t
t t t
+ Δ Ω + Δ Λ + Δ Γ + Δ + Φ + = Δ













ncpt is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 when the net creditor position of the 
Central Bank is lower than Col$ 1 trillion (approx. US$ 500 million) and zero 
otherwise. Unlike the effect of RARRh on interest rate pass-through and the asymmetric 
responses to policy rate changes, the influence of the NCP of the central bank is not 
general. It is restricted to a few lending interest rates (commercial bank treasury and 
prime lending rates) and most deposit rates (Tables 6 and 7). In these cases, a low or 
negative NCP weakens the interest rate pass-through in both directions. For an increase 
in policy rates, the abundant liquidity implied by the low NCP runs counter to the policy 
tightening. For a decrease in policy rates, it is possible that the market rates are already 
low in response to the small NCP. Hence, when the policy rate is reduced, a strong 
concurrent movement in the market rate is not observed. Impulse response function 
analysis corroborates these results when allowing for complete VEC system dynamics 
(Charts 5 and 6). 
 
Finally, the interaction of ncpt and dirt has negative coefficients for commercial treasury 
lending rates, savings and short term CD rates (Tables 6 and 7), indicating that the 
                                                 
10 A general model should include simultaneously the effects of RR, the asymmetry of the interest rate responses and 
the impact of the net creditor position of the central bank in the short run dynamics equation. However, these 
variables are all transformations of the lagged change in policy rates. Therefore, severe multicolinearity problems 
may arise, complicating statistical inference on the significance of the coefficients. That is why the estimation was 
done for each case separately. 
11 The only exception is that of long term CD rates (greater than 360 days) for which the response to policy rate 
increase is stronger. 
12 See footnote 9. 12 
 
transmission of  policy interest rate increases is diminished when the Central Bank´s net 




RR have been used in Colombia under an IT regime with different objectives. In 2007 
increases in RR were aimed at speeding up monetary policy transmission and at curbing 
excessive credit growth. In 2008 RR were again raised to sterilize part of the monetary 
expansion resulting from international reserve purchases. Later that year, they were 
reduced to ensure the provision of adequate liquidity in the context of heightened 
uncertainty brought about by the Lehman crisis. 
 
The effects of RR on interest rate and interest rate pass-through in an IT regime are not 
as straightforward as those under a monetary targeting regime. Conceptually, those 
effects depend on the degree of substitution between deposits and central bank credit as 
sources of funds for banks and on the extent to which RR changes affect the risks facing 
banks. The empirical results for Colombia suggest that RR are important long run 
determinants of business loan interest rates and have been effective in strengthening the 
pass-through from policy to deposit and lending interest rates.  
 
These findings support the use of RR as a policy instrument in an IT regime in terms of 
their effectiveness in reinforcing monetary policy transmission. These benefits must be 
contrasted with the fact that RR are costly taxes on financial intermediation and may be 
too blunt a tool to fine-tune the adjustment of credit markets or aggregate demand. 
Hence, their use is justified when policymakers perceive that standard, less costly policy 
instruments are deemed as insufficient to maintain price or financial stability. 
 
The empirical models used to assess the impact of RR on interest rates were also 
exploited to characterize other features of the dynamics of interest rate pass-through. 
For Colombia, policy rate transmission seems to be asymmetric, with rate drops 
generating larger responses of market rates than policy rate increases. Moreover, a low 
net creditor position of the central bank with the financial system appears to weaken the 
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ORR =  Observed Requires Reserve / Total Deposits Subject  to RR 
RARRc = Remuneration-Adjusted RR Ratio (fixed deposit composition) 
RARRh = Remuneration-Adjusted RR Ratio (variable deposit composition) 20 
 
Graph 13 































































































CD (Total) Savings Accounts CD90 CD>90,<=360 CD>360 RARRh (Right)  21 
 
Graph 15 
Average and Marginal CD Remuneration-Adjusted Reserve Requirements and Spreads 










































CD90-Pol. Rate CD>90,<=360 - Pol. Rate RARRCD CDTot-Pol. Rate Marginal RARRCD  
 
Graph 16 
Average and Marginal Savings Accounts Remuneration-Adjusted Reserve Requirements 
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Graph 18 
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Table 2 
Loan Interest Rates and Reserve Requirements 
LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP 
  Consumer  Loan  
Interest Rate  
Commercial  Loan 
Interest Rate 









Market Interest Rate  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0  1.0 
Constant  -6.690 182.710  0.464  82.036  -4.603      (-3.457) -5.367   (-5.383) 
Trend  0.0135     (0.484)  0.375      (5.721)  n.a.  0.139    (7.124)  n.a  n.a. 
Policy Interest Rate  -1.925     (-5.857)  -0.993     (-3.391)  -1.331    (-17.493)  -0.942   (-9.359) n.a  -1.158  (-9.823) 
Slope of the Yield 
Curve 
-1.437     (-4.897)  n.a  -0.463    (-7.370)  n.a  n.a  -0.662  (-5.885) 
RARRh  n.a.  -5.143     (-4.265)  -0.723   (-3.921)  -3.203   (-7.921)  n.a  n.a. 
Industrial Production 
Index 
n.a  -38.259    (-3.826)  0.461    (0.348)  -15.782    (-5.327)  n.a  n.a. 
TES Interest Rate  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  -1.060      (-9.956)  n.a 
SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS FOR LOAN INTEREST RATES 
  Δ Consumer 
Loan  Interest 
Rate  
 Δ Commercial 
Loan Interest 
Rate 
Δ Prime Lending 
Rate 
Δ  Commercial 
Bank Treasury 
Interest Rate 
Δ  Mortgage 
Interest Rate 
Δ  Average 
Lending Rate 
Cointegration Error  -0.072      (-3.339)  -0.092      (-3.817)  -0.314    (-5.369)  -0.155   (-4.395)  -0.102    (-3.792) -0.253   (-5.015) 
Constant  -0.080      (-1.995)  -0.003     (-0.072)  0.024    (0.819)  0.040    (0.926)  n.a  n.a. 
Δ  Loan Interest Rate   
(-1) 
0.084        (0.955)  -0.336    (-3.718)  -0.108    (-1.287)  0.149    (1.766)  0.253    (2.744)  0.014  (0.130) 
Δ Policy Interest Rate 
(-1) 
-2.231     (-2.627)  -2.892    (-2.937)  -2.380    (-3.551)  -0.962    (-1.736)  0.308       (2.646) -2.670  (-2.878) 
Δ Slope Yield Curve (-
1) 
-0.057     (-0.935)  n.a  0.040    (0.760)  n.a  n.a  0.0006  (0.007) 
Δ RARRh(-1)  n.a.  -0.228    (-1.078)  -0.219    (-1.61)  -0.361    (-2.703)  n.a  n.a. 
Δ  Policy Rate (-1)  * 
RARRh 
0.359      (2.606)  0.557    (3.340)  0.494    (4.630)  0.239    (2.573)  n.a  0.505  (3.430) 
Δ SA Industrial 
Production Index (-1) 
n.a.  -2.202    (-1.940)  0.667     (0.964)  -1.481     (-2.185)  n.a  n.a. 
Δ TES Interest Rate  n.a.  n.a  n.a.  n.a  -0.076     (-1.365)  n.a. 
Dummy variables  2007_01   
2007_04 
2003_12 n.a. 2008_11 
2009_10 
n.a n.a. 





Deposit Interest Rates and Reserve Requirements 
LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP 
 Savings  Accounts 
Interest Rate  
Short-Term CD 





Long-Term CD Interest 
Rate (greater than 360 days) 
Average CD 
Interest Rate  
Market Interest Rate  1.0 1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Trend  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Constant  -1.099   (-2.651)  0.013  -0.842     (-2.12)  0.229    (0.385)  n.a. 
Policy Interest Rate  -0.429     (-7.650)  -1.005    (-12.527)  -0.924    (-19.012)  -1.053    (-11.801)  -0.933    (-42.845) 
Slope of the Yield 
Curve 
n.a.  -0.638   (-5.352)  -0.550    (-10.88)  -0.565    (-12.786)  -0.491    (-15.569 
Marginal RARRh  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -0.181    (-2.010) -0.158     (-3.122) 
SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS FOR DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES 
  Δ Savings 
Accounts Interest 
Rate  
Δ Short-Term CD 
Interest Rate (90 
days) 
Δ Short-Term CD 
Interest Rate (91-
360days) 
Δ  Long-Term CD Interest 
Rate (greater than 360 days) 
Δ Average CD 
Interest Rate  
Cointegration Error  -0.091    (-2.214)  -0.153    (-3.631)  -0.248    (-5.549)  -0.546    (-4.979)  -0.276    (-7.01) 
Constant  n.a.  -0.018    (-0.945)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Δ Deposit Interest Rate 
(-1)  
0.116    (1.252)  0.017    (0.150)  -0.073     (-0.692)  0.101   (1.113)  -0.241   (-2.76) 
Δ Policy Interest Rate 
(-1)   
-0.488     (-2.075)  -0.655    (-1.490)  -1.259    (-3.305)  -2.679    (-2.252)  -1.767   (-5.17) 
Δ  Slope Yield Curve (-
1) 
n.a.  0.032    (0.556)  0.030    (0.751)  0.074     (0.739)  0.041    (1.074) 
Δ  RARRh (-1)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.044    (0.325)  0.008   (0.222) 
Δ Policy Rate (-1)   * 
RARRh 
0.124    (3.158)  0.198    (2.66)  0.290     (4.553)  0.466    (2.489)  0.402    (6.878) 















Loan Interest Rates - Asymmetric Response to Policy Rate Changes 
 
LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP 




Prime Lending Rate  Commercial Bank 
Treasury Interest Rate 
Average Lending 
Rate 
Market Interest Rate  1.0 1.0 1.0  1.0  1.0 
Constant  -7.394 103.296 7.503  92.755  -5.056 
Trend  0.013    (0.512)  0.243   (6.228)  n.a.  0.152      (7.516)  n.a. 
Policy Interest Rate  -1.819    (-5.773)  -0.868  (-4.988)  -1.326    (-14.957)  -0.950     (-9.229)  -1.207   (-9.076) 
Slope of the Yield Curve  -1.444    (-5.287)  n.a.  -0.526  (-7.058)  n.a.  -0.763  (-6.014) 
RARRh  n.a.  -2.651   (-3.673)  -0.398    (-1.932)  -3.245  (-7.681)  n.a. 
Industrial Production 
Index 
n.a.  -23.256   (-3.899)  -1.349     (-0.851)  -18.092   (-5.899)  n.a. 
SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS FOR LOAN INTEREST RATES 
  Δ Consumer 
Loan  Interest Rate 
Δ Commercial Loan 
Interest Rate 
Δ Prime Lending 
Rate 
Δ Commercial Bank 
Treasury Interest Rate 
Δ Average Lending 
Rate 
Cointegration Error  -0.066    (-2.916)  -0.183  (-5.178)  -0.264  (-4.732)  -0.155   (-4.758)  -0.207    (-4.320) 
Constant  -0.059     (-1.289)  0.023  (0.463)  0.031   (0.868)  0.041    (1.353)  n.a. 
Δ Loan Interest Rate (-1)  0.1024    (1.146)  -0.261    (-2.977)  -0.118      (-1.299)  0.125     (1.457)  0.027    (0.251) 
Δ Policy Interest Rate  (-
1) 
0.127    (0.627)  0.481   (2.308)  0.740  (3.878)  0.587     (3.335)  0.668    (3.261) 
Δ Slope Yield Curve (-1)  -0.063    (-1.006)  n.a.  0.049   (0.854)  n.a.  0.016     (0.186) 
Δ RARRh (-1)  n.a.  -0.139  (-0.674)  -0.049  (-0.350)  -0.325    (-2.472)  n.a. 
Δ Policy Rate (-1)  * dir 
(Asymmetric Effect) 
-0.691    (-1.962)  -0.944  (-2.467)  -0.671    (-2.468)  -0.496   (-2.196)  -0.993  (-3.121) 
Δ SA Industrial 
Production Index (-1) 
n.a.  -3.060  (-2.757)  0.101   (0.135)  -1.821      (-2.673)  n.a. 
Dummy variables  2007_01 
2007_04 
2003_12 n.a.  2008_11 
2009_10 
n.a. 






























1.0 1.0  1.0 
1.0 1.0 
1.0 
Constant  -0.850 0.088  -0.640  -0.802 0.136  n.a 
Policy Interest 
Rate 
-0.462  (-6.876)  -1.009  (-13.128)  -0.960  (-19.230)  -0.937  (-20.199)  -1.038   (-11.585)  -0.953    (-38.438) 
Slope of the 
Yield Curve 




n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  -0.185   (-2.040) -0.138     (-2.440) 
SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS FOR LOAN INTEREST RATES 
  Δ Savings 
Accounts 
Interest Rate 
Δ Short-Term CD 
Interest Rate (90 
days) 
Δ Short-Term CD 
Interest Rate (91-
360days) 
Δ Short-Term CD 
Interest Rate (91-
360days) 
Δ Long-Term CD 
Interest Rate 
(greater than 360 
days) 
Δ Average CD 
Interest Rate 
Cointegration 
Error  -0.063  (-1.736)  -0.165  (-3.789)  -0.227  (-5.138)  -0.256  (-5.691)  -0.574   (-5.374)  -0.246    (-6.008) 








0.304  (5.689)  0.639  (5.186)  0.690  (6.345)  -0.552  (-1.024)  -5.354   (-2.926)  0.840    (7.955) 
Δ Slope Yield 
Curve (-1) 
n.a  0.137    (0.232)  0.0345  (0.852)  0.023  (0.567)  0.091   (0.929)  0.044    (1.104) 
Δ Marginal 
RARRh (-1) 
n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  -0.010   (-0.075)  0.049    (1.199) 
Δ Policy Rate (-
1)  * dir 
-0.183  (-2.196)  -0.453  (-2.458)  -0.656  (-4.512)  -0.363  (-2.037)  1.161   (1.996)  -0.803    (-5.956) 
Δ Policy Rate 
*RARRh 
n.a  n.a  n.a  0.193  (2.323)  0.861   (3.093)  n.a 
Dummies 









Loan Interest Rates – Central Bank’s Net Creditor Position  
 
LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP 
  Commercial Bank Treasury 
Interest Rate 
Commercial Bank 
Treasury Interest Rate 
Prime Lending Rate 
Market Interest Rate  1.0 1.0  1.0 
Constant  84.667 81.888  2.198 
Trend  0.143   (7.201)  0.140   (7.264)  n.a. 
Policy Interest Rate  -0.984   (-9.849)  -0.998   (-10.188)  -1.429    (-16.255) 
Slope of the Yield Curve 
n.a.  n.a.  -0.508    (-7.44) 
Average Reserve Requirement 
-3.004   (-7.231)  -3.001   (-7.621)  -0.48    (-2.555) 
Industrial Production Index 
-16.520   (-5.553)  -15.892   (-5.429)  n.a. 
SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS FOR LOAN INTEREST RATES 
  Δ  Commercial Bank Treasury 
Interest Rate 
Δ  Commercial Bank 
Treasury Interest Rate 
Δ Prime Lending Rate 
Cointegration Error  -0.163   (-4.778)  -0.166   (-4.761)  -0.264    (-4.682) 
Constant  0.013   (0.516)  0.005   (0.210) -0.01     (-0.344) 
Δ Loan Interest Rate (-1) 
0.134   (1.522)  0.178   (2.105)  -.077    (-0.864) 
Δ Policy Interest Rate (-1) 
0.457   (2.730)  0.432   (2.701)  0.607    (3.495) 
Δ Slope Yield Curve  (-1) 
n.a  n.a  0.058    (1.03) 
Δ RARRh (-1)  -0.301   (-2.304)  -0.303   (-2.316)  -0.034    (-0.241) 
Δ  Industrial Production Index 
(-1)  -1.889   (-2.765)  -1.829   (-2.707)  n.a 
Δ  Policy Rate (-1) 
* dir * ncp   -0.518   (-1.648)  n.a  n.a 
Δ Policy Rate (-1) *  ncp 
n.a  -0.420   (-1.887)  -0.567    (-2.084) 
Δ Industrial Production Index 





2009_10  n.a 









Interest Rate  
Short-Term CD 
Interest Rate (90 
days) 
Short-Term CD 

















1 1  1  1  1  1  1 
Constant  -0.787 0.528  0.538  -0.003  -0.054  n.a  n.a 
Policy Interest 
Rate 
-0.471  (-6.534)  -1.064  (-11.318)  -1.071  (-11.663)  -1.018    (-13.46)  -1.011    (-13.704)  -0.920      
(-26.861) 
-0.929         
(-29.798) 
Slope of the 
Yield Curve 
n.a  -0.769    (-5.601)  -0.7101    (-5.323)  -0.631    (-7.961)  -0.591    (-7.765)  -0.497       
(-9.868) 





n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  -0.179       
(-2.242) 
-0.153         
(-2.106) 
SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS FOR LOAN INTEREST RATES 
  Δ Savings 
Accounts 
Interest Rate  
Δ Short-Term 
CD Interest 
Rate (90 days) 
Δ  Short-Term 
CD Interest 













Δ Average CD 
Interest Rate 
Cointegration Error  -0.047          
(-1.311) 
-0.115          
(-2.864) 
-0.117            
 (-3.056) 
-0.146           
 (-3.708) 
-0.161        
(-4.116) 
-0.175       
(-3.954) 
-0.194   (-4.434) 
Constant  n.a  -0.022           
(-1.138) 
-0.026             
(-1.386) 
n.a n.a     
Δ Deposit Interest 
Rate (-1) 
0.156    
(1.656) 
0.086    (0.773)  0.113    (1.023)  0.043    (0.401)  0.066    
(0.63) 
-0.070      
 (-0.694) 
-0.038   (-0.394) 
Δ Policy Interest 
Rate (-1) 
0.263    
(5.448) 
0.523    (4.777)  0.539    (5.163)  0.523    (5.021)  0.513    
(5.22) 
0.612   
(5.635) 
0.605   (5.850) 
Δ Slope Yield Curve 
(-1) 
n.a  0.03    (0.497)  0.048    (0.837)  0.069    (1.68)  0.072    
(1.759) 
0.023   
(0.506) 
0.022   (0.504) 
ΔMarginal RARRh 
(-1) 
n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.107   
(2.378) 
0.110   (2.525) 
Δ Policy Rate (-1)   * 
dir * ncp  
-0.185          
(-1.425) 
-0.357           
(-1.434) 
n.a  -0.438            
(-2.175) 
n.a  -0.474       
(-2.337) 
n.a 
Δ Policy Rate (-1)  *  
ncp 
n.a  n.a  -.0402    (-2.35)  n.a  -0.355        
(-2.395) 
n.a  -0.430   (-2.876) 
Dummies variables  2008_6 n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a n.a  n.a 
t-statistics in parenthesis.  
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Chart 1 
Impulse Response Functions for Loan Interest Rates  





Impulse Response Functions for Deposit Interest Rates 






Impulse Response Functions for Loan Interest Rates  






Impulse Response Functions for Deposit Interest Rates  





Impulse Response Functions for Loan Interest Rates  





Impulse Response Functions for Deposit Interest Rates  







Effect of RR on Interest Rate Pass-Through 
 
Betancourt and Vargas (2009) develop a partial equilibrium model of the deposit and 
credit markets in which risk averse banks use deposits (D) and central bank credit (B) to 
fund loans (C). A fraction e of deposits must be held as RR. Both credit and deposits 
have a 2-period maturity, whereas central bank credit has 1-period maturity. This 
implies that banks face interest rate risk because the cost of part of the funding of credit 
may change if the central bank moves the policy interest rate (ib) before loans mature. 
This risk makes deposit and central bank credit imperfect substitutes. In this setting 
Betancourt and Vargas find the following results regarding loan interest rates (ic), 
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ρ is the parameter of constant absolute risk aversion of banks. ib1 and ib2 are the policy 
interest rates for periods 1 and 2, respectively. Notice that ib2 is a random variable in the 
beginning of period 1. The loan demand function C
D(ic) depends inversely in lending 
interest rates: C
D
ic < 0. The deposit supply function D
































1 . Assuming that C
D
ic  and  D
S
id are constant, 
these derivates are: 
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13 A sufficient condition for these results to hold is B ≥ 0. 38 
 

























the value of central bank credit, B. The larger it is, the greater the interest rate pass-
through and the impact of RR on interest rate pass-through
14. A larger reliance on 
central bank credit implies a higher response of interest rate risk to policy rate increases. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Mathematically this can be seen in the expressions for the respective derivatives. In the case of the impact of RR on 
interest rate pass-through, 
de
dB




Remuneration-Adjusted Reserve Requirements 
 
The remuneration-adjusted reserve requirement for a particular deposit is the RR ratio 
without remuneration that yields the same equilibrium prices in quantities in the deposit 
and credit markets as the official RR ratio with remuneration.  
 
To compute it, the marginal net benefit of a deposit under the official RR ratio with 
remuneration is equated to the marginal net benefit of a deposit under the remuneration-
adjusted RR ratio: 
 
Under the official RR ratio, the marginal net benefit of a deposit for a competitive bank 
is:  c d r d c CMg r CMg i r i r i ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − + − − . Here ic is the nominal lending interest rate, 
id is the nominal deposit interest rate, CMgd is the marginal “operating” cost of deposits, 
CMgc is the marginal “operating” cost of loans, r is the required reserve ratio and  ir is 
the remuneration on the RR. Under the remuneration-adjustment RR ratio, the marginal 
net benefit of a deposit for a competitive bank is:  c d d c CMg e CMg i e i ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − − − − − . 
Here e is the remuneration-adjusted RR ratio
15.  
 
For the equilibrium that emerges from both RR regimes to be the same, lending and 
deposit interest rates, as well as deposit and loan volumes (and hence marginal costs) 
must coincide. Thus, the remuneration-adjusted RR ratio may be found by equating the 














r e 1    (A2-1) 
 
If some market power in the loan market or credit risk were allowed, the above 




















Here κ ∈ (0,1)  represents a “mark-up” term if there is market power or the fraction of 
interest that is collected if there is credit risk. Notice that the adjustment basically takes 
into account the fact that the burden of the RR is smaller the larger RR remuneration, ir , 
and the smaller the marginal revenue of a dollar lent (i.e. the opportunity cost of the 
RR).  
 
The expression for the remuneration adjusted RR ratio (e) may be refined to consider all 
the details that must be included in the net marginal benefit of deposits. In this paper, 
the basic formula assuming perfect competition (A2-1) is used as a rough 
approximation. Still, this simple equation has at least two practical problems for 
empirical purposes. First, “operational” marginal costs of lending are not observed. 
                                                 
15 Notice that at the bank optimum both net marginal benefits must be zero. 40 
 
And, second, if this measure is used in lending interest rate regressions, there will be a 
strong correlation by construction, since the lending rate is used in the definition of e. 
 
The second problem was solved by using the average overall lending interest rate for 
each year of the sample, so that monthly variation of e does not reflect lending interest 


































1  (A2-2) 



































I.e. marginal costs of loans are approximated by average costs. The latter, in turn, are 
estimated on the basis of an attribution of total operating costs
16 to loans according to 
the fraction of loans in total assets or in the aggregate Loans + Deposits. 
 
Formula (A2-2) was used to calculate the remuneration-adjusted RR ratio for each type 
of deposit j = {Checking Accounts and Sight Deposits, Savings Accounts, CD and 
Bonds with maturities ≤ 18 months}. When there were marginal RR (without 
remuneration), a weighted average of remuneration-adjusted average and marginal RR 
ratios was computed, using the amounts of deposits subject to average and marginal RR 
to construct the weights.  Hence, for each month, t , and deposit, j , in the sample there 
are estimates of remuneration-adjusted RR ratios, ej,t .   
 
















t j j t c
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(A2-3) allows for changes in deposit composition over time. In contrast (A2-4) uses a 
fixed deposit composition, corresponding to the sample average (May 2002 – 
November 2009). 
 
                                                 
16 Total operating costs include fees, personnel and depreciation of fixed assets. 